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The Suits That Counted: The Judicialization of 
Presidential Elections 
CHARLES ANTHONY SMITH and CHRISTOPHER SHORTELL 
ABSTRACT 
The litigation resolving the 2000 election received extensive attention, but there was also an 
increase in pre-election litigation in 2000, suggesting an increased reliance on courts even 
prior to Bush v. Gore. Did this trend of judicialization of presidential elections in the United 
States accelerate in 2004? To answer this question, we collect data on pre-election litigation 
from 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. Our findings show that the rate of prospective litigation in-
creased dramatically in the 2004 election, even accounting for state and federal electoral re-
form from 2001-2004. Beyond the increase in raw numbers, we find that the litigation was 
distributed strategically based on predicted closeness of the state and the number of electoral 
votes at stake. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this development. 
INTRODUCTION 
After the 2000 presidential election was re-
solved in George W. Bush's favor, much of the 
scholarly attention focused on the legal di-
mensions of Bush v. Gore and the Court's insti-
tutional or public standing (Chemerinsky 2001; 
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). In the en-
suing years, numerous articles and books ad-
dressed the decision's implications for the doc-
trine of equal protection, public support of the 
Court, and the political preferences of the jus-
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tices (Banks, Cohen, and Green 2005; Clayton 
2002; Hasen 2001, 2004; Levinson 2002; Posner 
2001; Sunstein and Epstein 2001). Certainly, the 
Court has received substantial criticism for its 
involvement in the 2000 election (Gillman 2001; 
Balkin 2001; Garrett in Sunstein and Epstein 
2001; Mebane 2004). Recently, the scholarly fo-
cus has turned to what effect the 2000 presi-
dential election may have on litigation and the 
role of the judiciary in future presidential elec-
tions (Foley forthcoming 2007; Hasen 2005; 
Lowenstein forthcoming 2007; Tokaji 2005). 
An expansion of the role of litigation in pres-
idential elections would be consistent with the 
broader trend of increased involvement by the 
judiciary in spheres formerly reserved to legiS-
latures and executives. Judicialization is the 
term most commonly used to describe this 
shift. This phenomenon has received substan-
tial notice in the academic literature, especially 
in the study of comparative politics (Ferejohn 
2002; Hirschi 2004; Pildes 2004; Shapiro and 
Stone Sweet 2002; Tate and Vallinder 1995). Did 
the legal decisions in the 2000 election acceler-
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ate the trend of judicialization of elections in 
the United States? In his 2002 article, Ran 
HirschI argued that Bush v. Gore is best under-
stood in the context of judicialization because 
it increases judicial involvement in the areas of 
"political transformation, regime change, and 
electoral disputes" (HirschI 2002, 192). Is this 
change sustained over time or was the 2000 
election an anomaly? What is the effect of the 
2000 presidential election on future presiden-
tial contests? Did the increase in litigation be-
gin after the 2000 election or was the trend de-
veloping prior to that? Is this an example of the 
increasing use of "electoral law as political 
strategy" (Hasen 2005, 957)? 
Our findings below suggest that the effect is 
lasting and that political actors use litigation 
both more frequently and more strategically 
than in the past. Comparative data from the 
1992,1996,2000, and 2004 elections allow us to 
consider whether parties, candidates, and in-
terest groups have increased their likelihood of 
litigating to gain electoral advantage and solve 
potential electoral disputes.1 We attempt to an-
swer this question by comparing the pre-elec-
tion litigation from the four most recent presi-
dential elections for all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia. By considering both the 
quantitative and qualitative shifts in litigation 
strategy, we demonstrate that pre-election liti-
gation has become an increasingly central part 
of the normal presidential election strategy, at 
least when a close election is anticipated. 
An increase in lawsuits in 2004 was not un-
expected, but were the suits widespread and 
random or were they narrowly focused in key 
competitive areas? We develop a logic of litiga-
tion that suggests the parties will litigate in pre-
dictable ways driven by electoral strategy. As a 
result, litigation is likely to play a far more 
prominent role in areas where the election is 
prospectively close. Close elections alone are not 
sufficient, however. Given the expense of litiga-
tion, we would expect to find most suits cen-
tered in close races with rich electoral pay-offs. 
In other words, Ohio is likely to see far more lit-
igation than either Illinois (low competitiveness) 
or New Hampshire (low electoral votes). While 
Hasen (2005, 946) points out this incentive struc-
ture with regard to post-election litigation, the 
logic holds true for pre-election strategies. 
SMITH AND SHORTELL 
Our analysis is not intended to suggest that 
litigation was unimportant to parties histori-
cally. Numerous examples of party directed lit-
igation abound, not only in areas such as re-
districting, but also in arenas of more extensive 
litigation by interest groups such as challenges 
to practices like the white primaries. Nor do we 
intend to suggest that parties were not previ-
ously interested in influencing the "rules of the 
game" for elections. Nonetheless, we argue that 
the electoral landscape has changed in signifi-
cant ways since 2000. In particular, there is an 
increased emphasis on litigation relating to the 
presidential election. Most of the prior litiga-
tion related to Congressional, state, and local 
issues. In the 1992 and 1996 presidential elec-
tions, pre-election litigation was almost non-ex-
istent. In 2000, both parties faced a remarkably 
close election and there was a consequent in-
crease in the number of pre-election lawsuits 
filed. 2004 saw a significant acceleration of this 
trend and a dramatic increase in the number of 
suits filed. 
The difference in the political landscape and 
logic after the 2000 election is that the political 
players now perceive the judiciary as a venue 
of first rather than last recourse. The strategic 
political lesson from the 2000 election litigation 
is that preventive (pre-election) litigation is a 
strategy far more likely to be successful than 
restorative (post-election) litigation. That is, 
courts are seen as one of the primary arenas for 
challenging the rules of the game before the 
election. At a minimum, the costs of failing to 
anticipate problems before election day are 
substantial enough that parties are unlikely to 
risk a more passive strategy.2 While the out-
come of the 2000 election did not initiate this 
trend, as evidenced by the increase in filings 
prior to that election, it does appear to have so-
lOur study does not address the further question of 
plaintiff success through litigation. The most we can con-
clude is that Hie conditions necessary for judicialization 
are present. However, it is reasonable to assume that ra-
tional actors would not continue to file suits if there were 
no benefits to be gained from them. 
2 Obviously, not all legal challenges can be brought 
prospectively. Concerns about standing caused one judge 
on the Sixth Circuit to vote to deny an injunction in Sum-
mit COllnty Democratic Central & Exeelltive Committee v. 
Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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lidified the developing notion among political 
actors that the courts are now a critical com-
ponent of a successful electoral strategy. 
In light of the events following the 2000 pres-
idential election, there is significant reason to 
believe that courts will be more involved in fu-
ture electoral disputes. The now-completed 
2004 presidential election offers the first op-
portunity to test whether the trend seen in 2000 
is continuing or was an anomaly. We expect to 
find a change in the raw number of suits filed, 
a shift -in the substance of the suits from local 
concerns to those that might alter the presi-
dential election outcome, and an increased in-
volvement of national political actors in the ini-
tiation of litigation. We also expect to find that 
the lawsuits in 2004 will be used in ways that 
are most likely to advance electoral victory, 
particularly in battleground states. An absence 
of any meaningful difference in these dimen-
sions of litigation from 2000 to 2004 would sug-
gest that the increase of litigation before the 
2000 election is not indicative of a developing 
pattern. As we will discuss, our findings con-
firm that litigation as a campaign and electoral 
strategy now holds a far more prominent place 
for political actors. These findings suggest that 
judicialization of presidential elections had be-
gun before the 2000 Florida controversy and 
that the Florida controversy accelerated the 
pace. 
METHODOLOGY 
To address the question of whether there was 
a change in the election strategy between the 
2000 and 2004 presidential elections, we col-
lected data on election-related cases filed in each 
state and the District of Columbia in both years. 
To test whether any change from 2000 to 2004 
was a new development or a continuation of an 
earlier trend, we also collected data on election-
rela ted cases filed in 1996 and 1992. We used the 
calendar year through election-day as our time 
parameter.3 In order to generate a comprehen-
sive set of relevant cases, we relied upon a com-
bination of Lexis-Nexis searches and a review of 
daily newspaper accounts.4 
Of the cases collected, we included only 
those filed before the close of election-day.s The 
filing of suits after an election is dependent al-
most entirely on whether the suits have any 
likelihood of changing the outcome of the race. 
Where the election-day results are close or 
within the "margin of litigation," as in 2000, 
there will be more post-election lawsuits 
(Hasen 2005, 938). Where the election-day re-
sults are not as close, as in 2004, post-election 
lawsuits are unlikely. As a result, any differ-
ences in the number of lawsuits filed after an 
election tell us little about whether relevant 
parties are more inclined to use the courts as 
part of their election strategy. 
In addition, the Court granted certiorari in 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board to 
address concerns about trying to change the 
rules after the election (531 U.S. 70 [2000]). This 
signals to potential litigants that it is better to 
file suits before the election rather than after, 
and we would expect the relevant parties to re-
spond to this doctrinal message. Additionally, 
a post-election strategy puts the litigants in a 
position to be framed as sore losers by their op-
ponents.6 Finally, study of cases filed prior to 
elections provides a more complete picture of 
the strategic calculations of political parties, 
3 It is possible that some cases were filed the year before, 
but it is unlikely that they were a significant number. Any 
action filed after the election would be geared towards 
restorative justice rather than electoral strategy. 
4 The full listing of cases is available at <http://www. 
csun.edu/ -cshortell/ electioncasesmatrix.xls>. Lexis-
Nexis provides access to all opinions of state appellate 
and supreme courts as well as written opinions from all 
federal courts. Search terms included "election," "candi-
dates," and "voting." Data collected from Lexis-Nexis 
were supplemented by news accounts of the filing of 
cases. Specifically, we collected the case name, the state 
the case was filed in, the jurisdiction (state or federal), and 
the claim being made by the plaintiff. Where possible, we 
also included the outcome of the case, but our data on 
that are not comprehensive so we could not use it to draw 
any conclusions. Any specific case that may have been 
overlooked would be unlikely to alter our findings in any 
significant way. For further verification of our 2004 totals, 
we compared our dataset to one published by election-
line.org, the only other reasonably complete list of cases, 
and we had identical or more comprehesive data for all 
states. (litigation update, Feb 14, 2005, electionline.org). 
5 We also excluded cases during the relevant years that 
addressed previous elections or elections that were not 
held on the same days as the primary or general elections. 
6 Consider the Republican campaign sign parodies of 
"Sore/Loserman" in the type, color and design of the 
"Gore/Lieberman" signs. 
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candidates, and interest groups that can be at-
tained from post-election cases. These actors 
would not pe expected to commit scarce re-
sources before an election without a reasonable 
belief that the commitment of the resources 
would result in some pay-off. For all these rea-
sons, we consider prospective lawsuits, those 
filed before an election, to be a reasonable mea-
sure of differences in strategy in presidential 
elections between 1992 and 2004. 
States that are expected to be close should 
attract more litigation. States that are ex-
pected to be close and also are rich in elec-
toral value should attract the most litigation. 
Not only are political parties more focused on 
these states, but interest groups are also more 
actively mobilized and likely to take action. 
Conversely, states that are not close should 
have little litigation and states that are not 
close and have little electoral value should 
have virtually no litigation. While states that 
are both closely contested and rich in electoral 
votes have always drawn the most attention 
from campaigns, pre-election litigation previ-
ously has not been an important element of 
this attention. If, contrary to our expectations, 
election litigation were not viewed strategi-
c~lly before or after 2000, we would expect to 
fmd a random distribution of cases across all 
states. 
We collected summaries of the facts for each 
case, including the legal basis of the claims as 
pleaded by the parties. We then sorted the cases 
into three categories based on subject area. The 
first category is Ballot Access. Ballot access in-
cludes any case addressing the inclusion of a 
candidate, party, or election oriented initiative 
on a ballot. For example, there were a number 
of challenges alleging that parties or candidates 
either failed to comply with qualifying rules or 
were being improperly denied a place on a bal-
lot. The second category is Voter Access and 
Regi~trati~n. This category includes any case 
dealmg WIth the act of voting, including cases 
about absentee ballots, pre-election day voter 
harassment, felony purge lists, or registration 
requirements. Our third and final category is 
Ballot Counting. This group of cases includes 
challenges to canvassing board standards, bal-
lot design, voting machine technology, and re-
count procedures? 
SMITH AND SHORTELL 
TABLE 1. TOTAL ELECTION CASES 
FILED DURING 1992 CYCLE 
State Federal 
Cts Cts 
Ballot Access 1 0 
Voter Ace/Reg 0 0 
Ballot Counting 0 0 






These categories provided a mechanism for 
sorting the cases for the purpose of detecting 
changes in the substantive nature of the litiga-
tion from election to election. We also distin-
guished between federal and state jurisdiction 
in order to assess whether litigants preferred 
one forum over the other. These procedures 
generated comparable data sets from the 1992, 
1996,2000, and 2004 election cycles. Addition-
~lly,. we sought to account for the wave of leg-
Islahve electoral reform that took place in the 
wake of the 2000 elections. All of the 2004 cases 
arising from a dispute over new electoral rules 
are separately identified and addressed. 
We will first consider the quantitative data 
from all the states and the District of Colum-
bia, discussing changes over time as well as the 
substance of the litigation. We then consider 
the data from the "battleground" states. After 
,:e examine the data, we consider its implica-
hons, draw some general conclusions, and 
make some suggestions for additional research. 
CASES PRIOR TO THE 1992, 
1996, AND 2000 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
By collecting data from the 1992, 1996, and 
2000 election cycles, we established a baseline 
for comparison with events in 2004. We deter-
mined the number of suits filed, the jurisdic-
7 Our ~lassifi~at~ons of the cases are, in practice, mutually 
exclus1ve. This 1S a reflection of the subject matter of the 
cases, rather t~an forcing cases into only one category. 
Ballot acce~s SU1ts, for example, dealt exclusively with bal-
lot access 1ssues. and not ~ith ballot counting. This has 
~e added benef1t of allowmg us to avoid double-count-
mg any cases. 
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tion of those suits, as well as the substantive is- TABLE 3. TOTAL ELEcnON CASES 
FILED DURING 2000 CYCLE 
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sues addressed by each case. By reviewing this 
information, we are able to get an overview of 
litigation activity prior to these elections. Ta-
bles 1,2, and 3 show the numbers and type~ of 
action in each of the three election cycles flIed 
in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. 
In both 1992 and 1996, there was only one 
pre-election case filed that was relate~ to t~e 
presidential election. In 1992, the Wlsconsm 
State Supreme Court heard a ballot access case 
brought by the ACLU in an effort to secure a 
place for ex-Klansman David Duke.on the Re-
publican presidential preference (pnmary) bal-
lot. And in 1996, a federal court dismissed an 
action to force New Hampshire to comply fully 
with the Motor Voter law. Hasen finds 108 elec-
tion related lawsuits nationwide in 1996, but all 
107 other cases deal with state or Congressional 
races (2005, 958).8 
These data suggest that while election litiga-
tion was going on, the focus was not on the 
presidential race. This is particularly striking 
for 1992, given the competitiveness of the elec-
tion and the inclusion of a prominent third 
party candidate, Ross Perot. Despite these fac-
tors, there was no litigation filed in an attempt 
to control ballot access for Perot or to alter voter 
access or registration. Lewis-Beck and Squire 
suggest that party efforts may have been di-
rected toward legislative efforts to heighten 
ballot access requirements such as signature-
gathering to keep third party candidates off the 
ballot (1995; see also Ansolabehere and Gerber 
1996). The absence of Perot-related litigation of-
fers some support for this view 'and suggests 
that the two major parties and their supporters 
did not consider the courts to be a viable strate-
gic avenue. 
The election of 2000 presents a marked con-
trast. State courts entertained a total of 17 cases 
TABLE 2, TOTAL ELEcnON CASES 
FILED DURING 1996 CYCLE 
State Federal 
Cts Cts 
Ballot Access 0 0 
Voter Acc/Reg 0 1 
Ballot Counting 0 0 



























while 31 federal suits were filed for a total of 
48 cases across the country. Several states had 
multiple suits in 2000. Pennsylvania had the 
most with seven cases. New Mexico had the 
. second most with five. Michigan, North Car-
! olina, and Washington each had four cases. 
Florida, Illinois, and New York each had three 
cases. California, Connecticut, Ohio, and Ore-
gon each had two cases. Seven states .ha~ one 
case and thirty-one states and the Dlstnct of 
Columbia had no pre-election litigation at all 
in 2000. Clearly the anticipated closeness of the 
election played a major, although not exclusive, 
role in an increased reliance on courts to me-
diate electoral disputes, even prior to election 
day. The pattern is one of increased judici~l­
ization of elections over time, though the m-
crease in presidential election litigation from 
1992 to 2000 is sudden rather than gradual. 
The notable jump in ballot access litigation 
from 1992 to 2000 is perhaps attributable to ret-
rospective consideration of the 1992 elect~on. 
Given the impact of Perot on the 1992 election, 
the parties may have worked harder adminis-
tratively to exclude third party candidates such 
as Nader and Buchanan from the ballot, ne-
cessitating the move to the courts by their sup-
porters. 
Most of the ballot access cases in 2000 in-
volved third parties such as the Green Party or 
the Libertarian Party and their candidates. 
Connecticut, for example, saw actions to secure 
a spot on the ballot by both Pat Buchanan and 
Lyndon LaRouche. In Florida, Buchanan a~d 
Hagelin litigated over who could clalm 
ballot access as the Reform Party candidate. 
Buchanan sued for inclusion on the Michigan 
8 Hasen's database of cases is available at <http://www . 
electionlawblog.org/ archives / washleeappendix.xls> . 
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ballot. Ralph Nader or the Green Party filed 
similar suits in Illinois, New York, North Car-
olina, Ohio, and West Virginia. 
Most of the voter access and registration cases 
involved issues such as the right of felons to vote 
or the ease with which registration could be ac-
complished. Litigation in Florida sought to re-
store felons' rights to vote, although all parties 
acknowledged the matter would not be resolved 
before the 2000 election. In Georgia, the United 
Nuwabian Nation of Moors sought to replace 
members of their group that had been purged 
from the voting rolls for a variety of different 
reasons. A case in Illinois sought to permit late 
registration for a group of teenagers whose orig-
inal registrations were ruled invalid because of 
technical deficiencies. A Maryland case sought 
to allow college students to register to vote 
where they were enrolled rather than at their 
home addresses. 
The four ballot counting cases were limited 
to questions about absentee ballots or the han-
dling of ballots. For instance, the Republican 
Party sued in New Mexico to stop a mass mail-
ing of absentee ballots and in Oregon where it 
claimed a county failed to secure ballots after 
a primary. Our findings strongly suggest that 
between 1992 and 2000, a change began to take 
place in the role of election litigation.9 The rea-
sons for this development are not entirely clear, 
but are likely related to the broader trends of 
~udic~a~ involvement in democratic politics 
IdentIfled by scholars such as HirschI and 
Pildes (Hirschi 2002; Hirschi 2004; Pildes 2004). 
This change, however, was still nascent and did 
not involve much participation from the most 
prominent and institutionalized political actors 
such as the two major parties and their presi-
dential candidates until after the election. The 
expanded use of the courts in these three areas 
before the election as· well as the post-election 
litigation in 2000 paved the way for the more 
aggressive participation of these political actors 
and a litigation explOSion in 2004. 
CASES PRIOR TO THE 2004 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
We used the same method of collection and 
categorization for the preSidential election of 
SMITH AND SHORTELL 
TABLE 4. TOTAL ELEcnON CASES 
FILED DURING 2004 CYCLE 
State Federal 
Cts Cts 
Ballot Access 27 14 
Voter Ace/Reg 24 27 
Ballot Counting 14 8 






2004 as for the previous elections. Litigation in 
2004 leaped beyond the already increased level 
found in 2000. Table 4 presents the numbers 
and types of actions filed prior to the 2004 elec-
tion in all fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia. 
In 2004, state courts entertained a total of 65 
cases while 49 federal suits were filed for a to-
tal of 114 cases across the country. This is a 
137.5 percent increase in litigation over 2000. 
While the litigants somewhat favored state 
courts over federal courts, both state and fed-
eral venues were active locales for litigation. 
Parties, candidates, and interest groups availed 
themselves of both avenues of judicial in-
volvement. Indeed, given the complex interac-
tions of state and federal election laws, it is not 
a surprise that litigants used both venues. 
While our data do not allow us to draw firm 
conclusions about the presence of forum shop-
ping, it is likely that litigants chose venues 
based primarily upon where they believed they 
could most likely prevail. These considerations 
could include the specific protections afforded 
by .state ~r federal laws, the nature of the legal 
claImS bemg pursued, or the desire to reach po-
litically sympathetic judges. Regardless, it is 
consistent with the mixed federal! state nature 
of electoral laws in the United States to find lit-
igation increase in both jurisdictions. 
Ballot access litigation emerged as a specific 
party strategy in 2004 as the 41 ballot access 
cases were almost exclusively efforts to secure 
or deny a place on the ballot for Ralph Nader 
9 The absence of a competitive ejection in 1996 may make 
the change appear more sudden than it was. Had 1996 
been a close election, we might have seen an increase in 
election litigation over 1992, although not necessarily to 
the degree seen in 2000. 
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TABLE 5. NADER CASES, 2000 vs. 2004 
2000 2004 
Suits seeking inclusion of Nader 





whether through the Green Party or the Reform 
Party. In Arizona, for example, one suit sought 
to force Nader's inclusion on the ballot while 
one suit sought to force his exclusion from the 
ballot. In fact, with the exception of one case in 
Kansas that sought an order allowing only Re:-
publicans to vote in the Republican primary, 
one case in Washington seeking to put the Lib-
ertarian Party on the ballot, and one case in 
Utah seeking to put a different Green Party can-
didate (Cobb) on the ballot, all of the ballot ac-
cess cases in 2004 involved Nader. The as-
sumption was that Nader on the ballot would 
help Bush and hurt Kerry. The premise under-
lying this assumption is that some Nader vot-
ers would vote for Kerry as an alternative if 
Nader was unavailable. The Nader litigation 
increased in number and changed in nature 
from 2000 to 2004. Table 5 shows the growth in 
lawsuits relating to Nader from the 2000 cycle 
to the 2004 cycle. 
The overt involvement of the Democrats and 
the Republicans in the Nader litigation in 2004 
increased dramatically. In states such as Col-
orado and Wisconsin, the local Democratic 
Party was the named plaintiff in attempts to ex-
clude Nader from the ballot. While either 
Nader or the Green Party would obviously be 
the plaintiff in litigation to include him on the 
ballot, the Republican Party provided support 
for Nader's signature gathering efforts (Stone 
2004). That is, in 2000, the litigation had been 
driven by a sincere effort by Nader and the 
Green Party to secure a spot on the ballot with 
little participation in the litigation by outside 
parties. The litigation in 2004 was driven by the 
strategic efforts of the two major parties to se-
cure or deprive Nader a spot on the ballot (Bur-
den 2005; Burden 2006). 
The question whether the presence or ab-
sence of Nader on ballots across the country ac-
tually changed the outcome of the presidential 
election speaks past the scope of this project. 
Indeed, given the general animus directed by 
Democrats at Nader after the 2000 election as 
well as the diminished vote share by Nader in 
2004, his presence or absence may have been 
inconsequen tial. lO Still, the concern abou t 
Nader on the ballot by both the Democrats and 
Republicans inexorably led to the use of pre-
election litigation to exclude or include him.ll 
Moreover, even if the Nader vote was incon-
sequential in the 2004 presidential vote distri-
bution, given the closeness of the 2000 election 
and the vigorous attention paid to Nader by 
the parties in 2004, each party is likely to liti-
gate aggressively when any third-party has 
some realistic chance of attracting enough 
votes to alter a race. If a candidate like Ross 
Perot ran today, that candidacy would face nu-
merous litigation challenges to try and keep 
him off or put him on the ballot. That is, in fu-
ture close elections with a competitive third 
party, the two major parties will litigate to keep 
ideologically close third parties off the ballot 
and third parties that are ideologically close to 
the opposition on the ballots. 
Voter access and registration was also a 
heavily litigated area in 2004. A total of 51 cases 
sought primarily to expand or restrict the abil-
ity of citizens to vote. Many of the cases sought 
to repeal the ban on felons voting or simplify 
the process for the restoration of civil rights. 
For instance, Ohio and Florida saw litigation 
aimed at creating an automatic restoration of 
felons' rights to vote. Many suits sought to 
make the rules for registration or voting more 
or less restrictive. In Colorado, for example, an 
action was brought to eliminate the require-
ment that first time voters present photo-
graphic idl;!ntification at the polls. An action in 
10 For example, according to the Florida Department of 
State, Division of Elections, in 2004, Nader received 32,971 
votes or .4% of the total presidential vote. In 2000 Nader 
received 97,488 votes or 1.6% of the total presidential vote. 
<http://election.dos.state.fl. us / elections / resul ts-
archive/lndex.asp> . 
11 As suggested by the number of suits seeking the in-
clusion of Nader on the ballot, the efforts by supporters 
of Kerry's candidacy included many administrative at-
tempts at exclusion in addition to efforts through the 
courts. A more aggressive legal strategy does not mean 
that remedies through election boards and secretaries of 
state are ignored. To the contrary, lawsuits provide a sup-
plement in an environment where a candidate's support-
ers are seeking any advantage they can obtain. 
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Nevada sought to extend the deadline for reg-
istration. Actions in Pennsylvania sought to 
prohibit felons from voting absentee an~ to al-
low additional time for overseas soldIers to 
vote. An action in Illinois sought to allow "stay-
at-horne-moms" to vote by absentee ballot. 
Each side sought to shape the pool of voters in 
ways that would be most favorable to its pre-
ferred.candidate. Generally speaking, support-
ers of Bush's candidacy tended to file suits over 
issues such as false registrations and the op-
portunity to challenge illegal voters, while sup-
porters of Kerry's candidacy filed suits. at-
tempting to expand the number of pOSSIble 
voters through easier registration requirements 
and permitting felons to vote. 
Given the litigation after the 2000 election re-
garding how votes would be counted or re-
counted, it is not surprising that ballot count-
ing suits played an important role in 2004. This 
category of suits increased from four in 2000 to 
twenty-two in 2004. The 22 ballot counting 
suits in 2004 addressed issues arising out of the 
switch to electronic voting, provisional ballots, 
and technically defective absentee and early 
voting ballots. For instance, cases in Ohio 
sought to prohibit the use of punch card vot-
ing, allow voters to cast provisional ballots in 
the event of registration errors, and allow ac-
cess to paper ballots in precincts where long 
lines created lengthy waiting times to cast elec-
tronic votes. In Iowa and Florida, among oth-
ers, suits were filed to force the inclusion of 
provisional ballots even if those ballots were 
cast in the wrong precincts. Litigation was filed 
in Maryland, Florida, and New Jersey seeking 
some sort of physical recount capacity where 
electronic voting systems left no paper-trail. 
The bulk of the ballot counting litigation was 
brought by plaintiffs favoring Kerry who 
sought to ensure that all ballots in Democratic 
strongholds would be counted. Provisional bal-
lots, paper trails, and challenges to electronic 
voting were all thought to advance this cause. 
A final point to make has to do with the sig-
nificant increase in litigation brought in their 
own names by the two major political parties. 
Both parties increased their direct participation 
in litigation. Cases where either the Democra-
tic or Republican party was the named plain-
tiff increased from five in 2000 to eighteen in 
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TABLE 6. CASES WITH POLITICAL PARTY AS PLAINTIFF 
2000 2004 
Democratic Party as Plaintiff 





2004.12 This measure understates the actual role 
of the political parties, since they also finan-
cially supported some lawsuits by individual 
voters and may have directed lawsuits by in-
terest groups. Nonetheless, the change is stark. 
The political parties more directly asserted 
themselves in the realm of litigation than in 
past presidential elections. 
THE INFLUENCE OF 
ELECTORAL REFORM 
The increase to 114 cases related to the pres-
idential election compared to 48 in 2000 and 
one each in 1992 and 1996 is undoubtedly sub-
stantial. However, the statutory landscape did 
not remain the same between 2000 and 2004. In 
fact, all 50 states engaged in fairly extensive 
electoral reform during the period and Con-
gress passed the Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA) in 2002. Both Hasen (2005) and Tokaji 
(2005) suggest that electoral reform played a 
major role in the increase in litigation. Could 
these electoral reforms fully account for the in-
crease in litigation between 2000 and 2004? 
In order to answer this question, we identi-
fied each of the cases in 2004 that challenged 
or was based on a law or policy promulgated 
at the state or federal level between 2001 and 
2004. For example, HA VA required that states 
provide the option of a provisional ballot to 
voters at the wrong precinct, so all provisional 
ballot cases can be considered electoral reform 
cases. Once we identified the cases, we re-
moved them from our case totals as presented 
in Table 7. 
There were 41 cases in 2004 that arose as a 
direct result of electoral reform. Removing 
12 These cases include both national and state level polit-
ical parties. 
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TABLE 7. TOTAL NON-ELECfORAL REFORM 
CASES FILED DURING 2004 CYCLE 
State courts Federal courts Total 
Ballot access 















them from our totals still leaves 73 cases, about 
a 50% increase over the 2000 totals. The major-
ity of the remaining cases fell in the category 
of ballot access, particularly cases relating to 
the inclusion of Ralph Nader on the ballot. 
There were still substantial numbers of voter 
access and registration cases. The ballot count-
ing cases constitute the smallest portion of the 
cases as before. Not surprisingly, these cases 
are also a smaller percentage of the total when 
the electoral reform cases are left out of ac-
count. 
This method is obviously not perfect, since 
both the electoral reform and the decision to 
challenge a new electoral law are in part con-
sequences of the 2000 election. The electoral re-
form movement certainly brought to light is-
sues that were previously unchallenged and 
could have indirectly contributed to the in-
creases seen in litigation in 2004. However, it is 
not clear that the election reform movement ini-
tiated lawsuits beyond those directly related to 
electoral reform. If anything, it is more likely 
that the information provided served as a sig-
nal to litigants about where to direct their liti-
gation efforts rather than whether to initiate lit-
igation at all. On the other side, it could be 
argued that our method is actually overstating 
the impact of electoral reform. In every election 
some of the litigation is based on new policies. 
In 2000, for example, 10 of the 48 cases were 
based on policies passed since the 1996 election. 
Nonetheless, even under the most conservative 
assumptions that all cases based on electoral re-
form shQuld be excluded, the change between 
elections remains dramatic. We can conclude 
with a fair degree of confidence that the rise in 
litigation between 2000 and 2004 was not dri-
ven by electoral reform alone. 
Another possible explanation is that litiga-
tion increased simply because the 2004 election 
was so close. The perceived closeness of the 
election is no doubt a major factor. However, 
the increase between 2000 and 2004 cannot be 
explained solely because 2004 was a close elec-
tion. 2000 also featured a dramatically close 
election. If perceived closeness of election were 
the sole factor the electoral reform adjusted 
rates of litigation should have been similar be-
tween 2000 and 2004. Indeed, on that assump-
tion there should have been more lawsuits in 
1992. That there were almost no cases in 1992 
and an almost 50% increase between the 2000 
and 2004 elections suggests an expected close 
election is at most a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a high level of litigation. 
We argue that in addition to the closeness of 
the election and the increase in electoral reform, 
the relevant political actors learned an impor-
tant lesson in 2000 and applied it in 2004. Pre-
election litigation can affect the outcome of the 
election and dedicating additional resources to 
legal battles is a necessary part of a successful 
electoral strategy. Courts, rather than poten-
tially partisan electoral boards and secretaries 
of state, may offer a more effective means of 
preventing abuse of the electoral system by op-
ponents or otherwise gaining an advantage. If 
political actors increasingly view litigation as a 
strategic tool, then, how does that affect the dis-
tribution of cases across states and subjects? 
A GRAPHIC COMPARISON OF 
2000 AND 2004 
We find that the increase in litigation across 
the three subject areas was not idiosyncratic or 
random. Indeed, the new litigiousness of the 
presidential election was demonstrably strate-
gic. An anticipated narrow vote margin in a 
state was not sufficient to cause a dramatic in-
crease in litigation. A rich electoral college pay-
off was also insufficient to attract litigation re-
sources before the election. However, a close 
race in an electorally rich state provided the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the par-
ties, candidates, and interest groups to commit 
to litigation. 
We plotted the data in a three dimensional 
representation in order to show that states with 
a close vote spread and relatively rich electoral 
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value saw the greatest increase in litigation. In 
Fig. 1 (2000) and Fig. 2 (2004), each state and 
the District of Columbia are represented by the 
circles. The Vote Spread, the percentile differ-
ence between the two major candidates, is plot-
ted on the Y axis (the axis on the far left of the 
diagram) while the electoral value, the number 
of Electoral Votes, is plotted on the X axis (the 
horizontal axis on the diagram). The number of 
Lawsuits is plotted on the Z axis. The Z axis il-
lustrates through the loft (or height) the vol-
ume of lawsuits. For ease of interpretation, 
grayscale bands have been employed to illus-
trate the number of lawsuits. Each band repre-
sents one lawsuit. In representing the data, 
each figure uses the same dimensional scale, 
orientation, grayscale, contrast, and lighting. 
Selected states are labeled for ease of compar-
ison. 
The first observation to be gleaned from the 
charts is that litigation dramatically increased 
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ther, because we would expect those states 
with both close elections and rich electoral val-
ues (close/rich states) to have more litigation, 
we would expect those portions of the "blan-
ket" of the three dimensional representation to 
be more peaked. A comparison of Figure 1 
(2000) with Figure 2 (2004) shows an expansion 
of litigation not only across the board, but more 
dramatically in those close/rich states. Ac-
cordingly, we can conclude that since the 
close/rich states did indeed attract more liti-
gation, the litigation was strategically driven. 
A comparison of the charts shows that non-
competitive states such as California and Texas 
showed little movement in litigation rates de-
spite rich electoral values. States with little elec-
toral value, such as New Hampshire, also 
showed little change in litigant activity despite 
relatively close elections. As expected, states 
like Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, all rich in 
electoral votes with competitive elections, drew 











FIG. 1. (2000) Number of Lawsuit as a Function of Victory Margin and Electoral Value 2000 Election. 
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FIG. 2. (2004) Number of Lawsuit as a Function of Victory Margin and Electoral Value 2004 Election. 
brought by the parties, candidates, and inter-
est groups. While Florida and Ohio obviously 
drew the largest amount of litigation, as two of 
the most competitive states, those two state.s 
alone do not account for the increase. Remov-
ing all of the lawsuits from Florida and Ohio 
from our analysis still leaves 74 lawsuits filed 
in 2004, compared with 48 in 2000. Consistent 
with our argument, the 74 remaining lawsuits 
are still arrayed strategically, with half of them 
being filed in the nine other battleground 
states. 
To determine whether we were capturing 
something other than a random distribution of 
litigation across the states, we ran a negative 
binomial regression using vote spread (Spread) 
and electoral votes (Electoral Votes) as indepen-
dent variables with the number of lawsuits as 
the dependent variable (Lawsuits)P The vote 
spread is the percentile difference between the 
vote share of the two major parties. The elec-
toral votes are the designated electoral votes 
each state may cast in the electoral college. As 
shown in Table 8, both Spread (z = -4.40) and 
Electoral Votes (z = 4.15) are highly significant 
in the expected directions. That is, the closer 
the race and the greater the electoral value, the 
more likely litigation will happen. These di-
rectionally significant results are what we 
would expect if the litigation was strategic-
that is, resources were utilized where the pay-
off could be maximized rather than in a ran-
dom or idiosyncratic manner. The year (2004) 
13 We first ran a Poisson regression because like many in-
cidents of counting events, the data follow a Poisson dis-
tribution. That is, the distribution is skewed, non-negative, 
and the variance likely increases as the mean increases. The 
Poisson model also assumes an equality of mean and vari-
ance. However, testing the Poisson regression, the large 
value of the Pearson Chi-sq (goodness of fit chi-sq was 
277.34) indicated over-dispersion. Although the statistical 
and substantive results are virtually identical, we present 
the results of the negative binomial regression in the text 
in order to account for over-dispersion. 
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TABLE 8. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 
LmGATlON, VOTE SPREAD AND ELECTORAL VOTES 
Lawsuits Coe! 
Spread -0.0691631 
Electoral votes 0.0615946 
Year dummy 0.8596208 
Constant -0.2007113 
Number of obs = 102 
LR chi2(3) = 50.35 






Log likelihood = -143.57833 





Liklihood-ratio test of alpha = 0: chibar2(01) = 59.63 
Prob > = chibar2 = 0.000 
was used as a dummy variable and, because 
there were more suits, the intercept shifted sig-
nificantly from 2000 to 2004 (z = 3.18). 
Analysis of the data restricted to the battle-
ground states also produced results consistent 
with our conclusions. We categorized a state as 
a battleground state if the final margin of vic-
tory was five points or less between the two 
major party candidates. While daily internal 
party polls would be the best source of deter-
mination for which states the parties consid-
ered to be battleground states, the final tally is 
a reasonable surrogate for the expectation of 
closeness. Moreover, little controversy exists as 
to which states were indeed battleground states 
for either 2000 or 2004 as there is a very close 
match between the states identified by the fi-
nal margin and those identified in earlier 
polling (Cook 2004; Nagourney and Seeyle 
2004).14 In Figure 3 (Battleground States), we 
show the magnitude of change in litigation 
rates for the eleven states we identified as bat-
tleground states. The bars represent the num-
ber of suits filed in each battleground state in 
2004 in excess of the number of suits filed in 
2000. Predictably, the states that were both clos-
est and richest in electoral votes had the great-
est magnitude of change in litigation rates. 
Note that while Florida and Ohio had the great-
est increases, the battleground states together 
accounted for 72 of the 114 total lawsuits filed 
in 2004. 
The aggregate data suggest that the location 
and substance of much litigation is driven by a 
desire for electoral advantage when the elec-
tion is perceived as close. Far more than in pre-
vious elections, courts are seen as a strategic 
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venue. Given the wide range and variety of av-
enues for litigation that can alter the rules for 
elections, it seems highly probable that in the 
future, major political parties and interest 
groups will develop litigation strategies well 
before close elections. 
IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
From the results of our study, it seems clear 
that the role of litigation in 2000 was not an 
anomaly. Indeed, it was a precursor of an in-
creased use of electoral law as political strategy 
in 2004. Even accounting for the intervening 
electoral reform legislation, the increase in the 
rate of litigation was substantial. Pre-election 
litigation has, therefore, assumed a far more 
prominent role in the election strategy of all po-
litical actors, at least when a close election is 
anticipated. While our findings must be situ-
ated in the larger context of increased judicial-
ization over time, we argue that 2004 may have 
represented a critical tipping point in the pro-
cess. Given the current competitive electoral 
landscape, there is no reason to anticipate a de-
cline in litigation in the near future Gacobson 
2003). 
We can also conclude that the parties will lit-
igate in predictable strategic ways. Rather than 
merely filing suits wherever a potential prob-
lem may arise, they will dedicate litigation re-
sources to states where cases are likely to have 
the greatest impact on the outcome of the elec-
tion. 
The events following the 2000 preSidential 
election appear to have caused a number of 
changes in how the relevant political actors 
proceeded in 2004. There is no question that po-
litical actors in 2000 were willing to engage in 
litigation at a significantly higher rate than in 
previous recent elections. Arguably this is a re-
sult of the anticipated closeness of the election, 
although it is also likely a consequence of the 
general trend of increased reliance on courts in 
14 For example, both the Cook Political Report 2004 and the 
New York Times 10/24/2004 listed the same battleground 
states as used here (Cook 2004; Nagourney and Seelye 
2004). 
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FIG. 3. Battleground States. 
election controversies (pildes 2004). In 2004, 
however, that activity multiplied dramatically 
in a similarly close election. This can be traced 
to several possible causes. Doctrinally, the 
Court's attempt to limit the scope of Bush v. 
Gore to "the present circumstances" was only 
partially successful as evidenced by the law-
suits in2004 that explicitly relied on the Court's 
holding (Bush v. Gore 2000, 109).15 
Beyond the doctrine, the courts signaled a 
willingness to hear election related disputes 
and, perhaps most importantly from the per-
spective of the judiciary, this intervention was 
accepted by the public, including those who 
disagreed with the outcome (Gibson, Caldeira, 
and Spence 2003). The perceived likelihood of 
the election results falling within the "margin 
of litigation" was also undoubtedly higher in 
2004. Few political commentators predicted 
just how close the 2000 election would end up. 
Few wanted to make the same mistake in 2004. 
The possibility that preSidential elections can 
be decided by relatively small changes in elec-
toral rules or procedures is an acknowledged 
reality today. Most importantly, parties, candi-
dates, and interest groups now recognize just 
how much can be lost by failing to engage in 
preventive litigation. The entire outcome of the 
2000 presidential election could have rested on 
the court decisions in the following months. 
Our evidence shows that the stakes are clear to 
the relevant groups, especially the major polit-
ical parties and their candidates. In contrast to 
2000, the major political parties were more di-
rectly involved and this involvement likely le-
gitimized further involvement by other liti-
gants. 
One question remains to be answered. How 
might these changes affect future presidential 
elections? The most obvious implication from 
this research is that parties, interest groups, and 
candidates now view the judiciary as a major 
factor in campaign strategies so long as races 
are close. As a result, litigation rates should re-
main at a higher level than they were in 2000 
whenever the race is close. As the closeness of 
15 See, for example, Bay County Democratic Party v. Land, 
347 F. Supp. 2d 404 (E.D.Mich. 2004). That case challenged 
ballot tabulation procedures in Michigan and relied ex-
plicitly on Bush v. Gore. 
264 
the race diminishes, the rate of litigation should 
also decrease, although we doubt it will return 
to the levels of 1992 and 1996 in the foreseeable 
future. It should be noted that this trend is not 
limited to just presidential elections. The liti-
gation surrounding both the recall election in 
California in 2003 and the San Diego mayoral 
and Washington gubernatorial races in 2004 fit 
the same trend. 
This judicialization of elections has profound 
implications at both the state and federal level. 
First, if federal courts continue to remain as ac-
tive in election litigation as they were in 2004, 
the stakes for the parties over federal judicial 
appointments could increase. As the impor-
tance of the judiciary in resolving disputes over 
electoral rules and procedures increases, the in-
centives for politicians to appoint loyal parti-
sans to the bench will also increase. Such a de-
velopment would likely lead to even greater 
political conflict in judicial confirmations, since 
the results could have a direct effect on the 
races of members of Congress and presidents. 
Thus, as elections become judicialized, the ju-
diciary becomes increasingly politicized. At the 
state level, where the judiciary is primarily 
filled through gubernatorial appointments and 
elections, the results would likely mirror the 
contentiousness of the federal level, with in-
creased rancor in elections and consideration 
of partisan loyalties by appointing bodies. 
Our research also implies a shift in respon-
sibility away from electoral boards and secre-
taries of state and to the judiciary. There are at 
least two potential positive outcomes from this 
shift. The first is that the courts could act less 
as partisans and more as "responsible" keep-
ers of the law. The potential for partisan abuses 
of authority by electoral boards and secretaries 
of state abounds. Certainly in Florida, there 
were many accusations of partisanship against 
Republican Secretary of State Glenda Hood for 
her intent to use the felony purge list despite 
its many shortcomings. Courts, assuming they 
are more removed from electoral pressures, 
may serve as a more stable and reliable insti-
tution for resolving contentious political dis-
putes. Secondly, as Tokaji argues, litigation of-
fers the opportunity to clarify confusing 
election legislation and regulations prior to 
their implementation (Tokaji 2005, 1243-1244). 
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It is better to resolve these disputes prior to 
election day than to have extensive post-elec-
tion battles, with the important caveat that the 
cases be filed far enough in advance to actually 
solve any identified problems in time. These 
potential benefits may be mitigated, however, 
by an increase in the politicization of the judi-
ciary as discussed above. There also is some 
reason for concern to the extent the running of 
elections is taken away from those most knowl-
edgeable about them and given instead to gen-
eralist judges. Finally, these developments sug-
gest that the role of the parties in elections will 
continue to increase as they coordinate the lit-
igation efforts and resources across the elec-
toral college landscape. 
We can conclude that future closely con-
tested states should show similar litigation 
emerging throughout the year before any close 
election. This development is consistent with 
the literature on the conditions necessary for 
the judicialization of elections. Additional re-
search that illuminates the source of the funds 
for litigation, the degree of coordination across 
venues, and the expected overlap of the legal 
elites across litigation forums may solidify our 
conception of the scope and importance of the 
judicialization of preSidential elections. 
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